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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Hospitals that are disadvantaged by their geographic 
location may reclassify to a different wage index area for 
certain Medicare reimbursement purposes by applying for 
redesignation to the Medicare Geographic Classification 
Review Board (“Board”).  Section 401 of the Medicare, 
Medicaid, and SCHIP Balanced Budget Refinement Act of 
1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (“Section 
401”), enacted ten years after the Board was established, 
creates a separate mechanism by which qualifying hospitals 
located in urban areas “shall [be] treat[ed] . . . [as] rural” for 
the same reimbursement purposes.  To avoid supposed 
strategic maneuvering by hospitals, the Secretary of the U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services issued a 
regulation providing that hospitals with Section 401 status 
cannot receive additional reclassification by the Board on the 
basis of that status.  See 42 C.F.R. § 412.230(a)(5)(iii) 
(“Reclassification Rule”). 
Geisinger Community Medical Center (“Geisinger”), a 
hospital located in an urban area, received rural designation 
under Section 401 but was unable to obtain further 
reclassification by the Board pursuant to the Reclassification 
Rule.  Geisinger sued the Secretary, Sylvia Matthews 
Burwell; the Administrator of the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (“CMS”), Marilyn Tavenner; and the 
Chairman of the Board, Robert G. Eaton, in their official 
capacities (collectively, “Appellees”), challenging the 
Reclassification Rule as unlawful.  The District Court upheld 
the regulation under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. 
Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), and granted 
summary judgment in favor of Appellees.  Because we 
conclude that Section 401 is unambiguous, we will reverse. 
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I. 
A. 
The Medicare program provides a system of federally-
funded health insurance for eligible elderly and disabled 
individuals under Title XVII of the Social Security Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395 et seq.  Under § 1395ww(d), or “subsection 
(d),” hospitals are reimbursed for inpatient costs at fixed rates 
for categories of treatment through an inpatient prospective 
payment system (“IPPS”).  Calculating inpatient 
reimbursement payments under IPPS is a multi-step process.  
First, the Secretary establishes a nationwide standardized rate 
for all subsection (d) hospitals located in an “urban” or 
“rural” regional area.  42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2)(A)-(D).  
Second, among other variables, CMS adjusts the standardized 
rate by a “wage index” that reflects the difference between 
hospitals’ local wages and wage-related costs and the national 
average.  Id. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E).   
 A hospital’s wage index is the wage index the 
Secretary assigns to the specific geographic area where the 
hospital is located.  Hospitals located in rural areas receive a 
wage index that applies to all rural areas in their state.  
Hospitals located in urban areas are grouped and treated as a 
single labor market based on the area, known as the Core 
Based Statistical Area (“CBSA”), in which they are 
physically located.  Higher wage indices, which reflect higher 
labor costs in relation to the national average, correspond to 
higher reimbursement rates.  Thus, the wage index is a 
significant determinant of the way hospitals are reimbursed 
for inpatient care costs. 
 IPPS may yield inequitable results where, for instance, 
a rural hospital’s lower wage index does not accurately reflect 
its labor costs because it competes for the same labor pool as 
hospitals in a nearby but higher wage-index urban area.  
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Thus, in 1987 and 1988, Congress amended the Medicare Act 
to allow a hospital to seek reclassification from its 
geographically-based wage index area to a nearby wage index 
area if it meets certain criteria.  See Robert Wood Johnson 
Univ. Hosp. v. Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2002) 
(explaining the history of the Board reclassification system).  
And in 1989, because only a limited number of hospitals were 
reclassified under those laws, Congress established the Board 
to systematically decide hospitals’ various reclassification 
requests.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(10).  “The Board shall 
consider the application of any subsection (d) hospital 
requesting that the Secretary change the hospital’s geographic 
classification for purposes of determining” the hospital’s 
average standardized rate or wage index.  Id. 
§ 1395ww(d)(10)(C).  Congress gave the Secretary authority 
to formulate guidelines to be used by the Board in rendering 
its decisions.  Id. § 1395ww(d)(10)(D)(i) (“The Secretary 
shall publish guidelines to be utilized by the Board in 
rendering decisions on applications submitted under this 
paragraph . . . .”).    
 Under those guidelines, which are generally listed at 
42 C.F.R. § 412 et seq., a hospital seeking reclassification 
must show (1) proximity to the area to which it seeks 
redesignation, 42 C.F.R. § 412.230(a)(2), (b)(1); (2) that the 
hospital’s three-year average hourly wage (“AHW”) is higher 
than other hospitals’ in the area in which it is located, id. 
§ 412.230(d)(1)(iii); and (3) that the hospital’s AHW is 
comparable to hospitals’ in the area to which it seeks 
redesignation, id. § 412.230(d)(1)(iv).  For all three criteria, 
there are more relaxed standards for hospitals located in rural 
areas.  For instance, the proximity rule requires that urban 
hospitals be located within 15 miles of the area to which it 
seeks reclassification, but only requires rural hospitals to be 
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within 35 miles.  Id. § 412.230(b)(1).  In addition, certain 
“special” status hospitals, such as rural referral centers 
(“RRCs”), are exempt from the first and second requirements.  
See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(10)(D)(iii); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 412.230(a)(3), (d)(3). 
 In 1999, ten years after the Board was established, 
Congress enacted Section 401.  Section 401 allows hospitals 
located in urban areas to be treated as hospitals located in 
rural areas for the purpose of determining three aspects of 
Medicare reimbursement:  inpatient reimbursement, 42 
U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(8)(E); outpatient reimbursement, id. 
§ 1395l(t); and critical access hospital eligibility, id. § 1395i-
4(c)(2)(B)(i).  Only the first component, which amends 
subsection (d), is at issue here.  It reads in full: 
42 U.S.C. [§] 1395ww(d)(8)[] is amended by 
adding at the end the following new 
subparagraph: 
 
(E)(i) For purposes of this subsection, not later 
than 60 days after the receipt of an application 
(in a form and manner determined by the 
Secretary) from a subsection (d) hospital 
described in clause (ii), the Secretary shall treat 
the hospital as being located in the rural area (as 
defined in paragraph (2)(D))1 of the State in 
which the hospital is located. 
 
(ii) For purposes of clause (i), a subsection 
(d) hospital described in this clause is a 
                                              
1 Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2)(D), “the term 
‘rural area’ means any area outside [] an [urban] area.” 
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subsection (d) hospital that is located in an 
urban area (as defined in paragraph (2)(D)) 
and satisfies any of the following criteria: 
 
(I) The hospital is located in a rural 
census tract of a metropolitan statistical 
area (as determined under the most 
recent modification of the Goldsmith 
Modification, originally published in the 
Federal Register on February 27, 1992 
(57 Fed. Reg. 6725)). 
 
(II) The hospital is located in an area 
designated by any law or regulation of 
such State as a rural area (or is 
designated by such State as a rural 
hospital). 
 
(III) The hospital would qualify as a 
rural, regional, or national referral center 
under paragraph (5)(C) or as a sole 
community hospital under paragraph 
(5)(D) if the hospital were located in a 
rural area. 
 
(IV) The hospital meets such other 
criteria as the Secretary may specify. 
Id. § 1395ww(d)(8).  In the Conference Report accompanying 
Section 401, Congress highlighted several benefits of a 
hospital receiving Section 401 status: 
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Hospitals qualifying under this section shall be 
eligible to qualify for all categories and 
designations available to rural hospitals, 
including sole community, Medicare dependent, 
critical access, and referral centers. 
Additionally, qualifying hospitals shall be 
eligible to apply to the Medicare Geographic 
[Classification] Review Board for geographic 
reclassification to another area. The Board shall 
regard such hospitals as rural and as entitled to 
the exceptions extended to referral centers and 
sole community hospitals, if such hospitals are 
so designated. 
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-479, 512 (1999).   
 The Secretary, in implementing Section 401, was 
concerned that the statute would “create an opportunity for 
some urban hospitals to take advantage of the [Board] 
process.”  See 65 Fed. Reg. 47,054, 47,087 (Aug. 1, 2000).  
She was afraid that some hospitals, claiming to be 
disadvantaged by their urban status, could first be reclassified 
as rural under Section 401 and thereby “receiv[e] the benefits 
afforded to rural hospitals,” and then subsequently claim 
disadvantage from that rural status and “seek reclassification 
through the [Board] back to the urban area for purposes of 
their standardized amount and wage index.”  Id.  As a result, 
the Secretary issued the Reclassification Rule: 
An urban hospital that has been granted 
redesignation as rural under § 412.103 [the 
regulation implementing Section 401] cannot 
receive an additional reclassification by the 
[Board] based on this acquired rural status for a 
year in which such redesignation is in effect. 
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42 C.F.R. § 412.230(a)(5)(iii).  Under the Reclassification 
Rule, a hospital with Section 401 status cannot be reclassified 
by the Board to a different wage index area for any year the 
hospital maintains that status.  To seek reclassification by the 
Board, therefore, a subsection (d) hospital must cancel its 
Section 401 designation.   
B. 
Geisinger is a not-for-profit, general, acute care 
hospital physically located in the Scranton-Wilkes-Barre-
Hazelton, PA CBSA.  It applied for designation as a Section 
401 hospital and was approved, effective June 11, 2014.  It 
also applied for designation as an RRC and was approved, 
effective July 1, 2014.2  On August 26, 2014, Geisinger 
cancelled its Section 401 status, effective October 1, 2015.  
On August 28, 2014, Geisinger submitted two 
applications to the Board to redesignate to a different urban 
area, effective October 1, 2015:  (1) on the basis of its Section 
401 status, a primary application as a rural hospital to 
reclassify to the Allentown-Bethlehem-Easton, PA-NJ CBSA 
(“Allentown CBSA”); and (2) on the basis of its cancelled 
Section 401 status, effective October 1, 2015, a secondary 
application as an urban hospital to reclassify to the East 
Stroudsburg, PA CBSA (“East Stroudsburg CBSA”), which 
would be considered only if the former was denied.  
Geisinger estimates that reclassification to the Allentown 
CBSA would increase its reimbursement payments by 
approximately $2.6 million per year and to the East 
Stroudsburg CBSA by approximately $1.3 million per year.   
                                              
2 See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(5)(C)(i) (providing that 
to earn status as an RRC a hospital must first be classified as 
rural).   
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The 27-mile distance between Geisinger and the 
Allentown CBSA fails to meet the proximity requirement 
under the Secretary’s rules for hospitals located in urban 
areas, but it meets the more relaxed criteria for hospitals 
located in rural areas.  See id. § 412.230(b)(1).  But for the 
Reclassification Rule, therefore, Geisinger’s primary 
application as a hospital with Section 401 status would be 
considered by the Board using the rural standards.  However, 
because it was “[l]eft with no choice but to try to comply with 
the Secretary’s illegal regulatory scheme or lose millions of 
dollars in reimbursement,” Geisinger cancelled its Section 
401 status so that the Board could alternatively consider its 
application to the East Stroudsburg CBSA, whose 
requirements it could meet as an urban hospital.3  Appellant’s 
Br. at 14.   
C. 
On September 10, 2014, while its applications were 
pending before the Board, Geisinger filed a complaint in the 
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  
Count I alleged that the Reclassification Rule violates Section 
401.  Count II alleged that the Reclassification Rule violates 
the Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”), 5 U.S.C. § 701 et 
seq.  Geisinger sought a declaratory judgment that the 
Reclassification Rule was unlawful and a permanent 
                                              
3 Geisinger’s application to the East Stroudsburg 
CBSA relied on a rule that allows a hospital with current 
status as an RRC (as of the date of the Board’s review) to 
reclassify to the nearest urban area without satisfying 
proximity requirements.  See 42 C.F.R. § 412.230(a)(3).  
Geisinger is located 15.7 miles away from the East 
Stroudsburg CBSA, which is the nearest urban area to 
Geisinger. 
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injunction, an order of mandamus, or both, prohibiting the 
agency from applying the Reclassification Rule to its pending 
applications and ordering it to apply the rural standards.  
The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment 
and the District Court granted Appellees’ motion on 
December 22, 2014.  See Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. 
Burwell, Civ. A. No. 3:14-1763, 2014 WL 7338751 (M.D. Pa. 
Dec. 22, 2014).  The District Court first explained that it had 
subject matter jurisdiction because Geisinger challenged the 
legality of the Reclassification Rule itself and not the 
agency’s decisions on its applications, over which the 
Medicare Act precludes judicial review.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww(d)(10)(C)(iii)(II) (providing that Board decisions 
may be appealed to the Secretary and that “[t]he decision of 
the Secretary shall be final and shall not be subject to judicial 
review”).  On the merits, the District Court held that because 
Congress did not expressly provide that Section 401 extends 
to the Board reclassification process, and because Congress 
granted the Secretary broad authority to administer that 
process, Section 401 was ambiguous at Step One of Chevron, 
467 U.S. at 842-43.  At Step Two, the District Court 
concluded that the Secretary’s decision to eliminate the 
potential for “inconsistent reclassifications of the same 
hospital for the same period” and other “unintended 
consequences” vis-à-vis the Reclassification Rule was a 
reasonable accommodation of Section 401 and therefore 
should be upheld.  Geisinger, 2014 WL 7338751, at *10.  
Geisinger timely appealed.  
On February 23, 2015, the Board did not treat 
Geisinger as located in the rural area of Pennsylvania and 
denied Geisinger’s primary application for reclassification to 
the Allentown CBSA.  It approved Geisinger’s secondary 
application for reclassification to the East Stroudsburg CBSA 
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on the basis that Geisinger had cancelled its Section 401 
status.  Reinforcing the application of the Reclassification 
Rule, the Administrator of CMS affirmed the Board’s 
decision on June 1, 2015.4 
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1361 and 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.  We 
exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
The Court reviews the District Court’s grant of 
summary judgment de novo.  Montone v. City of Jersey City, 
709 F.3d 181, 189 (3d Cir. 2013).  Under the APA, a 
reviewing court may “hold unlawful or set aside agency 
action, findings, and conclusions” that are found to be, inter 
alia, “not in accordance with law.”  5 U.S.C. § 706(2).  While 
we usually afford deference to an agency’s interpretation of a 
statute it is charged with administering, “when we are called 
upon to resolve pure questions of law by statutory 
                                              
4 Because Geisinger does not seek judicial review of 
the denial of its applications, this Court maintains jurisdiction 
over the appeal.  See ParkView Med. Assocs., L.P. v. Shalala, 
158 F.3d 146, 148 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (explaining that 
“hospitals [are] free to challenge the general rules leading to 
denial” where the Secretary affirmed the Board’s denial of 
plaintiff’s reclassification request); Universal Health Servs. v. 
Sullivan, 770 F. Supp. 704, 710 (D.D.C. 1991) (“The 
[Medicare] Act does not . . . expressly preclude judicial 
review of the guidelines utilized by the Board and the 
Secretary in deciding upon reclassification requests.”); cf. 5 
U.S.C. § 702 (conferring a general cause of action upon 
persons “suffering legal wrong because of agency action” and 
withdrawing it where the relevant statute precludes judicial 
review).  
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interpretation, we decide the issue de novo without deferring 
to [the] agency.”  Port Auth. Trans-Hudson Corp. v. Sec’y, 
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 776 F.3d 157, 161 (3d Cir. 2015) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
III. 
Because this case concerns a challenge to an agency’s 
construction of a statute, we use the familiar two-step analysis 
set forth in Chevron.  “First, always, is the question whether 
Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  
If the intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; 
for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the 
unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.”  Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 842-43.   We proceed to Step Two “if the statute is 
silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”  Id. at 
843.  Then, “the question for the court is whether the 
agency’s answer is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute,” and the regulation must be given deference unless it 
is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute.”  
Id. at 843, 844.   
The “precise question at issue” here is whether the 
Secretary is required to treat hospitals with Section 401 status 
like hospitals physically located in rural areas for purposes of 
Board reclassification.  Id. at 842.  Based on the plain 
language of the statute, we conclude that Congress has 
unambiguously expressed its intent that the Secretary shall do 
so.  Because Congress’s intent is clear, we complete our 
analysis at Step One and do not proceed to Step Two to 
determine whether the Reclassification Rule is a permissible 
construction of Section 401.    
A. 
To determine whether a statute is unambiguous under 
Step One, “court[s] should always turn first to one, cardinal 
 14 
canon before all others[:]  We have stated time and again that 
courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.”  Conn. Nat’l 
Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992).  That is, 
because we presume Congress expresses its intent through the 
ordinary meaning of the words it uses, an exercise of statutory 
interpretation must begin by examining the plain and literal 
language of the statute.  See United States v. Geiser, 527 F.3d 
288, 294 (3d Cir. 2008). And “[w]here the statutory language 
is plain and unambiguous, further inquiry is not required.”  
Rosenberg v. XM Ventures, 274 F.3d 137, 141 (3d Cir. 2001); 
In re Price v. Del. State Police Fed. Credit Union, 370 F.3d 
362, 368 (3d Cir. 2004) (“We are to begin with the text of a 
provision and, if its meaning is clear, end there.”). 
While we also read the language in its broader context 
of the statute as a whole, see id. at 369-70, this Court made 
clear in United States v. Geiser that “legislative history 
should not be considered at Chevron [S]tep [O]ne,” 527 F.3d 
at 294; In re Phila. Newspapers, LLC, 599 F.3d 298, 304 (3d 
Cir. 2010) (“Where the statutory language is unambiguous, 
the court should not consider statutory purpose or legislative 
history.”).  Following the Court’s established precedent on 
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this matter, we will not consider legislative history in our Step 
One analysis.5  
With this framework in mind, we turn to the text of 
Section 401.  The relevant portion reads:  “For purposes of 
this subsection . . . the Secretary shall treat the hospital [with 
Section 401 status] as being located in the rural area (as 
defined in paragraph (2)(D)) of the State in which the hospital 
is located.”  42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(8)(E)(i).  The parties 
make several quasi-textual and -structural arguments 
supporting their interpretation of the statute that we group 
into three categories and discuss in turn.   
1. 
 Geisinger’s first argument relates to Section 401’s 
opening clause, “[f]or purposes of this subsection.”  Id. The 
                                              
5 Geisinger argues that the Supreme Court’s recent 
plurality decision in Lawson v. FMR LLC, which cited to the 
legislative record to determine whether a provision of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act was ambiguous, mandates that legislative 
history should now be considered at Step One.  134 S. Ct. 
1158, 1169-71 (2014).  However, the Supreme Court has 
often oscillated between considering and then refusing to 
consider legislative history at Step One.  We explicitly noted 
the Supreme Court’s “ambiguous guidance” in this regard and 
nonetheless firmly staked our position in Geiser.  527 F.3d at 
293.  If the Supreme Court had intended to clarify the 
widespread confusion around this issue, we imagine that it 
would say so clearly.  And even if it had, it bears emphasis 
that the decision was a plurality opinion.  In any event, this 
Court has spoken clearly on its refusal to consider legislative 
history at Step One, see id., and we see no reason to revisit 
that decision because some members of the Supreme Court 
considered legislative history in passing in Lawson. 
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subsection to which the statute indisputably refers is 
subsection (d), which, as discussed, addresses a wide range of 
rules for inpatient care reimbursement under the Medicare 
program, including the requirements for calculating the 
standardized rate for rural and urban regional areas, id. 
§ 1395ww(d)(2)(D); adjusting the wage index on the basis of 
a hospital’s local geographic area, id. § 1395ww(d)(3); and 
administering the Board reclassification process, id. 
§ 1395ww(d)(10).  Geisinger alleges that this clause, which 
explicitly directs the Secretary to apply Section 401 for 
purposes of subsection (d), requires the Secretary to apply 
Section 401 to subsection (d)(10), i.e., the Board 
reclassification process.  We agree.   
 One of our “most basic interpretive canons” is that “[a] 
statute should be construed so that effect is given to all its 
provisions, so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous, 
void or insignificant.”  Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 303, 
314 (2009) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted); see also Rosenberg, 274 F.3d at 142 (“[T]he 
preferred construction of a statute and its regulations is one 
that gives meaning to all provisions.”).  Here, Congress must 
have intended that Section 401 apply comprehensively over 
subsection (d), including subsection (d)(10), because the 
language “[f]or purposes of this subsection” would not have 
any purpose or meaning if it did not.   
Appellees counter that because Section 401 is not 
applicable to every paragraph within subsection (d), whether 
Section 401 must apply to the Board reclassification process 
is ambiguous.  For instance, the command that a hospital shall 
be treated as rural is not applicable to subsection (d)(6), 
which requires the Secretary to make certain publications in 
the Federal Register, 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(6); or 
subsection (d)(7), which limits administrative and judicial 
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review, id. § 1395ww(d)(7).  In other words, there are some 
subsection (d) provisions for which the hospital’s rural status 
is irrelevant.  
 But this does not contravene Congress’s intent—
demonstrated by using the clause “[f]or purposes of this 
subsection”—that Section 401 governs everywhere it is 
applicable; it does not contravene Congress’s intent that 
Section 401 governs everywhere a hospital’s rural status is 
relevant.  Cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chap. of Cmtys. for a 
Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 722 (1995) (“[T]he definition of 
‘take’ in [a provision of the Endangered Species Act] applies 
‘[f]or the purposes of this chapter,’ that is, it governs the 
meaning of the word as used everywhere in the Act.”).  As 
discussed, a hospital’s urban-rural geographic location has a 
dispositive effect on the hospital’s designated standardized 
rate and wage index.  In turn, it has a dispositive effect on the 
Board reclassification process, the statutory purpose of which 
is to redesignate the hospital from rural to urban or vice versa 
for purposes of receiving a new standardized rate or wage 
index.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(10)(C).  This bolsters our 
conclusion that Congress intended Section 401 to apply to 
these specific processes.  Thus, we must read Section 401 as 
mandating that for purposes of Board reclassification, which 
is inextricably intertwined with a hospital’s rural or urban 
designation, the Board shall treat the hospital as rural.  
 The District Court disagreed with this construction, 
concluding that “the statute does not discuss the Board 
reclassification process at all, nor does it discuss the 
intersection of redesignation and geographic reclassification 
under the Medicare Act.”  Geisinger, 2014 WL 7338751, at 
*8; see also Appellees’ Br. at 23 (arguing that Section 401 is 
“silent” with regard to Board reclassification).  Appellees 
further contend that if Congress had intended that subsection 
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(d) hospitals be able “to take advantage of both 
reclassification procedures almost simultaneously, piling 
exception on top of exception,” then it would have done so 
more clearly.  Appellees’ Br. at 25.    
 In other words, the District Court and Appellees read 
ambiguity into the statute because of what it does not say, 
rather than read it for what it plainly says.  To be sure, 
Congress did not explicitly provide that Section 401 applies 
to subsection (d)(10).  But it did explicitly provide that 
Section 401 applies for purposes of subsection (d), which 
covers subsection (d)(10) and had covered it for ten years 
before Section 401 was amended.  To comprehensively 
amend subsection (d)—which contains dozens of paragraphs 
and subparagraphs concerning inpatient reimbursement, many 
of which involve a hospital’s rural or urban status—rather 
than each provision within it, Congress necessarily used 
broad language.  Still, “[a]s a general matter of statutory 
construction, a term in a statute is not ambiguous merely 
because it is broad in scope.”  See In re Phila. Newspapers, 
599 F.3d at 310; see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 
303, 315 (1980) (“Broad general language is not necessarily 
ambiguous when congressional objectives require broad 
terms.”).  If the phrase was not intended to cover subsection 
(d)(10), contrary to the literal reading of the text, then 
Congress would have noted which paragraphs of subsection 
(d) were specifically excluded or included.  It did not.  And 
despite Appellees’ attempt to infer intent against layering the 
two reclassification processes, the Court cannot ignore the 
plain language of the statute.  “Our task is to apply the text, 
not to improve upon it.”  Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm’t 
Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989). 
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2. 
 Next, Geisinger points to the portion of the text 
mandating that hospitals with Section 401 status be treated 
“as being located in the rural area (as defined in paragraph 
(2)(D)) of the state where the hospital is located.”  42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww(d)(8)(E)(i).  Paragraph (2)(D) defines “rural area” 
as “any area outside” an urban area.  Id. § 1395ww(d)(2)(D).  
Because there is only one definition of “rural” within 
subsection (d), Geisinger argues, Congress must have 
intended that the Board evaluate applications from hospitals 
with acquired-rural status under Section 401 in the same way 
it evaluates applications from hospitals physically located in 
rural areas.   
 Appellees argue, however, that Geisinger’s 
interpretation is permissible under the plain language of the 
statute, but it is not compelled.  Another interpretation of 
Section 401, they reason, is that the Secretary must treat 
Section 401 hospitals as rural for all inpatient reimbursement 
purposes and, therefore, must not reclassify those hospitals as 
urban under the Board reclassification process.   
To be sure, “[a] provision is ambiguous only where the 
disputed language is reasonably susceptible of different 
interpretations.”  In re Phila. Newspapers, 599 F.3d at 304 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “But just because a 
particular provision may be, by itself, susceptible to differing 
constructions does not mean that the provision is therefore 
ambiguous. . . . Rather, a provision is ambiguous when, 
despite a studied examination of the statutory context, the 
natural reading of a provision remains elusive.”  In re Price, 
370 F.3d at 369.  Here, the natural reading of Section 401 and 
the statutory scheme reinforces Geisinger’s view.   
Section 401 does not say that we cannot reclassify the 
Section 401 hospital as urban.  It says we must treat the 
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Section 401 hospital as rural for purposes of subsection (d), 
including subsection (d)(10).  This means that Section 401 
hospitals must be able to participate in the Board 
reclassification process and seek redesignation from their 
current location to another location for purposes of receiving 
a new standardized rate or wage index.  To this end, Section 
401 mandates that hospitals with Section 401 status be treated 
as rural, which has well-settled meaning and implications 
under the Medicare Act.  See supra Part I.A.  Thus, hospitals 
with Section 401 status should apply as being located in the 
rural area of their state and be evaluated by the Board under 
the more relaxed standards regularly applied to rural 
hospitals.  Considering this “broader, contextual view” 
together with the text, In re Price, 370 F.3d at 369, we find 
the statute unambiguous.  Appellees’ view that Section 401 
hospitals cannot be reclassified as urban would, in effect, 
prohibit hospitals with Section 401 status from reclassifying 
under subsection (d)(10), contrary to the plain and natural 
reading of the statute. 
3. 
Third, and finally, Geisinger focuses on Section 401’s 
command that “the Secretary shall treat” hospitals with 
Section 401 status as rural.  42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(8)(E)(i) 
(emphasis added).  Geisinger argues that the “shall” language 
in Section 401 must be viewed as mandatory.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 607 (1989).  
Indeed, “[t]he word shall is ordinarily the language of 
command.”  Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 153 (2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).   
 Appellees do not dispute that Section 401 uses 
mandatory language, nor do we.  Appellees argue, rather, that 
because Congress granted the Secretary authority to 
promulgate guidelines for the Board reclassification process, 
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see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(10)(D), the Reclassification Rule 
was a permissible and necessary exercise of that authority in 
the supposed gap that Section 401 created.  Appellees 
emphasize that “[n]othing in Section 401 constrains the 
Secretary’s broad discretion to establish criteria for Board 
reclassification,” which “‘is precisely the type of legislative 
gap-filling that [courts] entrust to an agency’s sound 
discretion.’”  Appellees’ Br. at 23 (quoting Santomenno ex 
rel. John Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. 
(U.S.A), 768 F.3d 284, 299 (3d Cir. 2014)).  
 But this authority was granted in subsection (d)(10), 
which, again, covers the Board reclassification process.  
While the Secretary is unquestionably authorized to issue 
guidelines regarding Board reclassification, e.g., to design the 
proximity standards for urban versus rural hospitals, it does 
not follow that the Secretary is authorized to disregard the 
plain language of Section 401.  Rather, Section 401’s 
mandate that the Secretary shall treat Section 401 hospitals as 
rural without adding any discretionary language as Congress 
used in subsection (d)(10) and elsewhere in Section 401 itself, 
see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(8)(E)(i) (referencing the receipt 
of an application “in a form and manner determined by the 
Secretary”); id. § 1395ww(d)(8)(E)(ii)(IV) (establishing as 
the last criterion for Section 401 eligibility any “other criteria 
as the Secretary may specify”), lends itself to the opposite 
conclusion.  “[W]here Congress includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the 
same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts 
intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or 
exclusion.”  Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
Congress could have granted the Secretary discretion to 
administer Section 401.  It did not.  Rather, it used 
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commanding language and the Court must give that language 
effect, notwithstanding the Secretary’s independent authority 
to develop guidelines used in the Board reclassification 
process.  
B. 
Section 401 refers to subsection (d) in its entirety, 
which includes the Board reclassification process; requires 
the Secretary to treat Section 401 status hospitals as rural, 
which has a singular definition and well-settled implications 
under the Medicare Act; and uses mandatory language 
(“shall”).  Altogether, we read Section 401 to reflect 
Congress’s unambiguous intent on the “precise question at 
issue,” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842:  for subsection (d) 
purposes, including administering Board applications for 
wage index reclassification, the Secretary shall treat Section 
401 hospitals as located in the rural area of the state.  Because 
Congress’s intent is clear, we end our inquiry here and do not 
reach Chevron Step Two.  See id. at 843 n.9 (“If a court, 
employing traditional tools of statutory construction, 
ascertains that Congress had an intention on the precise 
question at issue, that intention is the law and must be given 
effect.”).   
IV. 
Congress has unambiguously expressed its intent that 
the Secretary shall treat Section 401 hospitals as rural for 
Board reclassification purposes.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww(d)(8)(E)(i).  We conclude, therefore, that the 
Reclassification Rule is unlawful and reverse the District 
Court’s order granting Appellees’ summary judgment motion. 
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COWEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting 
 
 The majority offers a well-reasoned reading of Section 401.  
In fact, the majority may even offer the most persuasive 
interpretation of this statutory provision.  However, it is not this 
Court’s job to adopt what it believes to be the best reading of the 
statute.  Instead, we must “use the familiar two-step analysis set 
forth in Chevron.”  (Majority Opinion at 12.)  Under this doctrine, 
we must first decide whether or not “Congress has directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue.”  Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural 
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).  If we 
conclude that the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the 
specific question at issue, the Court must then consider whether the 
agency’s approach is based on a permissible construction of the 
statute.  See, e.g., id. at 843.  “‘Chevron deference is premised on 
the idea that where Congress has left a gap or ambiguity in a 
statute within an agency’s jurisdiction, that agency has the power 
to fill or clarify the relevant provisions.’”  Santomenno ex rel. John 
Hancock Trust v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co. (U.S.A.), 768 F.3d 
284, 299 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Core Commnc’ns, Inc. v. Verizon 
Pa. Inc., 493 F.3d 333, 343 (3d Cir. 2007)), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
1860 (2015).  Accordingly, the Court must leave undisturbed “‘a 
reasonable accommodation of conflicting policies that were 
committed to the agency’s care by the statute . . . unless it appears 
from the statute or its legislative history that the accommodation is 
not one that Congress would have sanctioned.’”  Chevron, 467 
U.S. at 845 (citation omitted).  We must defer to an agency’s 
reasonable construction of a statute—“whether or not it is the only 
possible interpretation or even the one a court might think best.”  
Holder v. Martinez Gutierrez, 132 S. Ct. 2011, 2017 (2012) (citing 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843-44 & n.11).  Because I believe that 
Section 401 is ambiguous and that the Reclassification Rule 
constitutes a permissible interpretation of this statutory provision, I 
must respectfully dissent. 
 2 
 
 
 “Section 401 refers to subsection (d) in its entirety” (which 
includes subsection (d)(10)), expressly requires the Secretary to 
treat a Section 401 hospital as being located in the rural area (as 
defined in subsection (d)(2)(D)) of the State in which the hospital 
is located, and, in the process, “uses mandatory language” (i.e., 
provides that the Secretary “shall” treat the hospital as being 
located in a rural area).  (Id. at 21.)  Even if Section 401 
unambiguously requires that a Section 401 hospital be treated as 
though it were a hospital located in a rural area for purposes of 
subsection (d)(10), it does not follow that this statutory provision 
unambiguously requires the Secretary and the Board to consider 
applications filed by Section 401 hospitals under the same exact 
criteria the Secretary adopted to govern reclassification 
applications filed by hospitals physically located in rural areas. 
 
 I agree with the District Court (as well as the United States 
District Court for the District of Connecticut) that Section 401 is 
silent as to whether hospitals reclassified as rural under Section 
401 must be considered eligible for Board reclassification pursuant 
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to subsection (d)(10).1  See Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp. v. Burwell, 
Civ. No. 3:13cv1495 (JBA), 2014 WL 7338859, at *6 (D. Conn. 
Dec. 22, 2014); Geisinger Cmty. Med. Ctr. v. Burwell, --- F. Supp. 
3d ---, 2014 WL 7338751, at *8 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Lawrence & 
Mem’l Hosp. v. Burwell, 986 F. Supp. 2d 124, 135 (D. Conn. Dec. 
6, 2013).  Section 401 does not expressly address the specific 
criteria that must be satisfied in order to obtain Board 
reclassification.  Even though it contains mandatory language, this 
statutory provision does not expressly direct the Secretary or the 
Board to treat Section 401 hospitals exactly the same as hospitals 
physically located in rural areas as part of the Board 
reclassification process.  In fact, the provision does not address the 
Board reclassification process at all—nor does it take into account 
the intersection or relationship between Board reclassification 
                                                 
1 It appears that, although the Reclassification Rule 
was promulgated in 2000, only two lawsuits have been filed 
(to date) challenging the lawfulness of this rule.  In addition 
to the current proceeding filed by Geisinger in 2014, 
Lawrence & Memorial Hospital commenced an action in the 
District of Connecticut in 2013 attacking the Reclassification 
Rule as unlawful under the terms of Section 401.  The 
Lawrence & Memorial Hospital court initially denied the 
hospital’s motion for a preliminary injunction (enjoining 
defendants from acting on its application for Board 
reclassification under subsection (d)(10) until the district 
court could hold a hearing on the merits of its action).  See 
Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., 986 F. Supp. 2d at 127-38.  It 
subsequently granted summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants.  See Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., 2014 WL 
7338859, at *1-*10.  Lawrence & Memorial Hospital’s 
appeal is currently pending before the Second Circuit.      
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under subsection (d)(10), on the one hand, and Section 401 
reclassification, on the other hand. 
 
 According to the majority, the District Court and Appellees 
have read ambiguity into the statute based on what it does not say, 
as opposed to what it plainly says.  However, “what it does not 
say” (id. at 17) is of special significance here given Congress’s 
creation of two reclassification mechanisms.  Both Section 401 and 
subsection (d)(10) effectively serve as exceptions to the general 
principle that a hospital’s reimbursement is tied to its physical 
location.  Does Section 401 unambiguously grant hospitals like 
Geisinger the right “to take advantage of both reclassification 
procedures almost simultaneously, piling exception on top of 
exception”—and to do so under the same Board reclassification 
standards that otherwise apply to hospitals physically located in 
rural areas?  (Appellees’ Brief at 25.)  Given the statutory silence, 
the answer to this question must be “No.”  According to Appellees, 
Section 401 could reasonably be read as a directive for the 
Secretary to treat Section 401 hospitals as rural for all purposes, 
thereby prohibiting any further reclassification under subsection 
(d)(10).  While this may not be the best reading of the statutory 
provision, the majority goes too far by claiming that it is contrary 
to the plain and natural reading of this provision.  After all, Section 
401 broadly applies to subsection (d) and states, inter alia, that the 
Secretary “shall treat” the hospital as being located in the “rural” 
area of the State.  Congress, in any event, left what could only be 
considered a “‘gap’” between two distinct reclassification 
mechanisms, which the Secretary attempted “‘to fill’” by adopting 
the Reclassification Rule.  Santomenno, 768 F.3d at 299 (citation 
omitted).  In fact, Congress delegated to the Secretary broad 
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discretionary authority over the Board reclassification process.2 
 
 Subsection (d)(10)(D)(i) provides that “[t]he Secretary shall 
publish guidelines to be utilized by the Board in rendering 
decisions on applications submitted under this paragraph.”  The 
majority acknowledges that “the Secretary is unquestionably 
authorized to issue guidelines regarding Board reclassification, 
e.g., to design the proximity standards for urban versus rural 
hospitals,” but it underestimates the scope and significance of this 
delegation of authority.  (Majority Opinion at 20.)  This Court has 
recognized that Congress established the Board to pass on 
applications for reclassification “according to certain standards and 
guidelines” and then “gave the Secretary the authority to formulate 
the guidelines to be used by the [Board].”  Robert Wood Johnson 
Univ. Hosp. v. Thompson, 297 F.3d 273, 276 (3d Cir. 2002) (citing 
subsection (d)(10)(D) and 42 C.F.R. § 412.230 et seq.); see also, 
e.g., Athens Comty. Hosp., Inc. v. Shalala, 21 F.3d 1176, 1179 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (indicating that Congress delegated to Secretary 
authority to determine degree to which Board’s discretion should 
                                                 
2 I further note that the majority also relies on what 
Section 401 “does not say” at several points in its opinion.  
(See Majority Opinion at 17 (“If the phrase was not intended 
to cover subsection (d)(10), contrary to the literal reading of 
the text, then Congress would have noted which paragraphs 
of subsection (d) were specifically excluded or included.”), 
19 (“Section 401 does not say that we cannot reclassify the 
Section 401 hospital as urban.”), 20-21 (“Rather, Section 
401’s mandate that the Secretary shall treat Section 401 
hospitals as rural without adding any discretionary language 
as Congress used in subsection (d)(10) and elsewhere in 
Section 401 itself, lends itself to the opposite conclusion.” 
(citations omitted)).   
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be limited); Universal Health Servs. of McAllen, Inc. v. Sullivan, 
770 F. Supp. 704, 716-17 (D.D.C. 1991) (explaining that Congress 
intended to grant Secretary power to establish substantive criteria 
for Board reclassification), aff’d mem., 978 F.2d 745 (D.C. Cir. 
1992).  “The broad deference of Chevron is even more appropriate 
in cases that involve a ‘complex and highly technical regulatory 
program,’ such as Medicare, which ‘require[s] significant expertise 
and entail[s] the exercise of judgment grounded in policy 
concerns.’”  Robert Wood Johnson, 297 F.3d at 282 (quoting 
Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994)); see 
also, e.g., Universal Health Servs., 770 F. Supp. at 718 (“Judicial 
deference is particularly appropriate because the Secretary’s 
obligation to promulgate reclassification guidelines involves an 
‘“accommodation of conflicting policies that were committed to 
the agency’s care by statute, . . .”’ [Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845] 
(citations omitted).  As previously discussed, the Secretary’s duty 
to ensure budget neutrality is at odds with his duty to reclassify 
hospitals so that they may receive increased Medicare 
reimbursement.  The Secretary, as sole administrator of the 
Medicare Act, is in a unique position to evaluate and reconcile the 
competing policy concerns within the Medicare program.”). 
 
 Most of the substantive standards or criteria that the Board 
uses to dispose of reclassification applications are set forth in the 
Secretary’s own regulations.  Congress did expressly direct the 
Secretary to include guidelines for, inter alia, “comparing wages” 
in the area in which the hospital is classified and the area in which 
the hospital is applying to be classified.  § 1395ww(d)(10)(D)(i)(I).  
It also specified that the guidelines shall provide for the Board to 
base any comparison of the “average hourly wage” on the average 
of the AHW in the most recently published data and such amount 
from each of the two immediately preceding surveys.  § 
1395ww(d)(10)(D)(vi).  “Under the guidelines published by the 
Secretary under clause (i), in the case of a hospital which has ever 
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been classified by the Secretary as a rural referral center under 
paragraph (5)(C), the Board may not reject the application of the 
hospital under this paragraph on the basis of any comparison 
between the average hourly wage of the hospital and the average 
hourly wage of hospitals in the area in which it is located.”  § 
1395ww(d)(10)(D)(iii).  In turn, it was the Secretary—and not 
Congress—that then adopted the specific criteria that a hospital 
must meet, i.e., a basic proximity requirement as well as standards 
for comparing the hospital’s AHW with the AHW of other 
hospitals located in the area in which the hospital is located and 
with the AHW of hospitals in the area to which it seeks to 
reclassify.  See, e.g., Universal Health Servs., 770 F. Supp. at 706-
22 (rejecting challenge to Secretary’s proximity requirement).  It 
was also the Secretary that chose to treat urban and rural hospitals 
differently for purposes of these criteria by, among other things, 
specifying disparate proximity criteria for urban and rural 
hospitals.  I note that subsection (d)(10) does not even use the 
terms “urban hospital,” “hospital located in an urban area,” or 
“rural hospital.”  Although it does refer to RRCs, the subsection 
expressly mentions “hospitals located in a rural area” only once, 
and it does so to specify that two Board members shall be 
representatives of such hospitals.  § 1395ww(d)(10)(B)(i). 
 
  The majority appears to suggest that this delegation of 
authority is entitled to little, if any weight, in the current inquiry 
because it was set forth in subsection (d)(10)—and not Section 
401.  According to the majority, “Section 401’s mandate that the 
Secretary shall treat Section 401 hospitals as rural without adding 
any discretionary language as Congress used in subsection (d)(10) 
and elsewhere in Section 401 itself lends itself to the opposite 
conclusion [that the Secretary is not “authorized to disregard the 
plain language of Section 401”].”  (Id. at 20-21 (citations 
omitted).)  As the majority recognized, we nevertheless must read 
the language of a statutory provision in its broader context.  See, 
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e.g., FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
132-33 (2000). 
 
Section 401 itself purportedly amends subsection (d)(10) 
(which was enacted ten years earlier).  It is this subsection (and not 
Section 401) that establishes the Board and grants the Secretary the 
power to develop guidelines for the Board.  It is reasonable to 
conclude that Congress believed there was no need to add 
additional language expressly granting the Secretary power to 
adopt regulations regarding the eligibility of Section 401 hospitals 
for Board reclassification (and the criteria to be used in assessing 
their applications for Board reclassification) because Congress had 
already delegated to the Secretary broad discretionary authority 
over the entire Board reclassification process.  In subsection 
(d)(10)(D)(iii), Congress expressly prohibited the Secretary from 
adopting any guideline allowing the Board to reject an application 
filed by a hospital that has at any time been classified as an RRC 
on the basis of a comparison of its AHW to the AHW of hospitals 
in the area in which it is located.  Congress similarly could have 
amended subsection (d)(10) to add, for instance, language directing 
the Secretary to publish a guideline requiring the Board to consider 
applications filed by Section 401 hospitals under the same exact 
criteria that govern reclassification applications filed by hospitals 
physically located in rural areas.  It did not do so, and I find that 
this fact strongly weighs against the majority’s conclusion that 
Congress unambiguously expressed its intent that the Secretary 
shall treat Section 401 hospitals as rural for Board reclassification 
purposes.  (Cf., e.g., id. at 20-21 (“‘[W]here Congress includes 
particular language in one section of a statute but omits it from 
another, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally 
and purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.’  Russello 
v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).”).) 
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 Because I conclude that Congress has not “directly spoken 
to the precise question at issue” in this case, Chevron, 467 U.S. at 
842-43, I must consider whether the Reclassification Rule 
constitutes a permissible construction of Section 401.  Given the 
statutory ambiguity, it was the Secretary’s task—exercising the 
broad discretionary authority granted under subsection (d)(10)—to 
attempt to fill the gap that exists between two reclassification 
mechanisms.  See, e.g., Santomenno, 768 F.3d at 299.  It is then 
our obligation to decide whether this “‘interpretation is reasonable 
in light of the language, policies, and legislative history’” of 
Section 401 and the statutory scheme as a whole.  United States v. 
McGee, 763 F.3d 304, 315 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting GenOn REMA, 
LLC v. EPA, 722 F.3d 513, 522 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 135 S. 
Ct. 1402 (2015).  In light of the fact that Chevron deference is 
especially appropriate in the Medicare context, see, e.g., Robert 
Wood Johnson, 297 F.3d at 282, I believe that the Reclassification 
Rule satisfies Chevron Step Two. 
 
 As the District Court aptly pointed out in its ruling, “[i]t 
cannot be said that the Secretary’s regulation, which was 
promulgated to avoid permitting a hospital to be treated as rural for 
some purposes and as urban for others allowing the hospital to 
receive inappropriate reimbursements, was unreasonable, even if 
the plaintiff can point to other reasonable policy choices.”  
Geisinger, 2014 WL 7338751, at *11.  In the respective preambles 
to the proposed and final rules implementing Section 401, the 
Secretary addressed the statutory language, identified her primary 
concern about this legislation (e.g., that hospitals physically 
located in urban areas might try to take advantage of Section 401 
by obtaining reclassification under this statutory provision and the 
various benefits accorded to rural hospitals and then seek 
reclassification under subsection (d)(10) back to urban areas for 
standardized amount and wage index purposes), explained why 
such a result would be inappropriate, and considered but rejected 
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alternative approaches.  Medicare Program; Changes to the 
Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems & Fiscal Year 
2001 Rates, 65 Fed. Reg. 47,054, 47,087-89 (Aug. 1, 2000); 
Medicare Program; Changes to the Hospital Inpatient Prospective 
Payment Systems & Fiscal Year 2001 Rates, 65 Fed. Reg. 26,282, 
26,308 (May 5, 2000); see also, e.g., Lawrence & Mem’l Hosp., 
2014 WL 7338859, at *8 (“[T]he record shows that the Secretary’s 
decision was deliberate, logical, and considered.”).  She expressly 
addressed the Conference Report accompanying Section 401.  65 
Fed. Reg. at 47,087-89; 65 Fed. Reg. at 26,308.  By stating that the 
Section 401 hospitals shall be eligible for Board reclassification 
and that “[t]he Board shall regard such hospitals as rural,” the 
report does weigh in favor of Geisinger’s reading of this statutory 
provision.  H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 106-479, 512 (1999).  However, 
this report (which did not mention subsection (d)(10)’s delegation 
of authority to the Secretary and did not expressly consider the 
potential problems that could arise from the existence of two 
distinct reclassification mechanisms) is insufficient to establish 
that Congress would never have sanctioned the Secretary’s 
Reclassification Rule.  See, e.g., Chevron, 467 U.S. at 845.  In the 
end, the Secretary appropriately exercised the power she was 
granted by Congress so as to reconcile the distinct reclassification 
mechanisms created by Congress. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the order of the 
District Court granting Appellees’ motion for summary judgment. 
